Can India be firm with China on Brahmaputra basin dams?

India and China share rivers and much more…

Can India be firm with China on Brahmaputra basin dams?

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s forthcoming India visit (15-17 Dec 2010) provides another useful opportunity for India to be firm and forthright with China on India’s concerns about Chinese dam and hydropower projects on the shared rivers, including in the Brahmaputra basin. The importance of this issue cannot be underscored considering that this issue has been raised in the Parliament several times, even the Prime Minister has had to make clarifications in the recent past, the people and governments of several states, including Assam and Arunachal Pradesh have been agitated about this. India’s Planning Commission, Environment, Water Resources and Power Ministries have also been raising these concerns.

Unfortunately, India has been less than firm and forthright with China on these issues in the past. For example, the Indian government has informed the Parliament in the past that China has not disclosed the reasons for floods in Himachal Pradesh in August 2000 and in Arunachal Pradesh in June 2000, when the floods in both cases originated from China. Both floods created huge devastations in India.

China started the construction of the 510 MW Zangmu Hydropower project on the Yarlung Tshangpo (as Siang, the main tributary of Brahmaputra is known in Tibet see the location map above) on Nov 12, 2010. India reacted to that only after the Indian media picked up the news from international media reports. Worryingly, the report from the China’s news agency Xinhua said the US$ 1.2 billion project “can also be used for flood control and irrigation”. For a project to be useful for irrigation and flood control it needs to store and divert water. But even without these features the Zangmu and the numerous other hydropower projects that China plans will have adverse downstream impacts. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei did clarify to media that China took "full consideration of the potential impact on the downstream area."

But note that this clarification really says nothing either about the downstream impacts or what consideration they have given to such impacts. Should Indian government complain about this? The trouble is, when Indian government responds to downstream countries about the dams and hydropower projects it builds or when India responds to even its own people, Indian government response is almost in same ambiguous, escapist and almost insulting language and manner. To illustrate, when an Indian Union Minister responded to a question in Parliament about impact of Arunachal Pradesh hydro projects on downstream Assam, the answer was, “No specific information is available regarding threats to existing identity of indigenous people of Assam by mega dams proposed in the NER”. Should not the water resources ministry be more forthright about the adverse impacts that Assam people are sure to face due to the existing and proposed Arunachal projects?

As a matter of fact, Indian, Arunachal and Assam governments have often justified the expeditious clearance and building of big dams in the North East, saying that it will establish first user right. The trouble is, firstly there is no international law or mechanism where such a right can be defended against actions of upstream countries. Such a defence would be possible if there was a treaty on sharing the common rivers, like the Indus Treaty that India has with Pakistan. But no such treaty exists between India and China on any of the rivers that the two countries share. And India has not used its substantial leverage (The delegation accompanying the Chinese premier includes 400 business people and five years back too Wen went back from India after a successful business trip) to push any such treaty.

The only international convention in this regard, the UN Convention on Non navigational uses of international watercourses was approved in 1997 by a vote of 104-3. Interestingly, China was one of the only three nations that voted against the convention. India did not do it a great favour by abstaining from voting. The convention in any case it yet to come to force since sufficient number of countries are yet to ratify it. But even when it gets ratified, as noted by a task force report from India’s defence think tank IDSA (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses), such laws are “difficult to implement and often contradictory”. No effective international court exists for such conflict resolution. Unfortunately, the IDSA report ends up with a rather problematic suggestion, “As a counter-measure to China's plan for the diversion of the Yarlung-Tsangpo, India should propose a south Asian-China-ADB power project with international support on the Great Bend.” Such a suggestion would be seriously counter productive since it will justify the worst feared of the proposals China has of building a 38 000 MW hydropower project on Brahmaputra and diverting it to the Northern part in phase two. In fact, China has multiple projects lined up on Tsangpo, as can be seen from the map above.

China’s track record, however, is far from encouraging in this regard. What is going on in the Mekong basin is a good guide. There exists an international Mekong Commission including countries like the Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, and the commission is backed by powerful Japan and the Asian Development Bank. But China, which is not part of the commission, has been building hydropower projects which are affecting the downstream existing projects adversely, but the downstream countries could do nothing about the Chinese projects. The downstream countries can at best request China to make amends. What happened to such requested in Mekong basin? This is what an editorial in major Thailand dialy, Bangkok Post wrote on March 10, 2010, “But those requests have gone in one Beijing ear and out the other for years.” This completely demolishes the first user principle argument that supporters of dams in Arunachal Pradesh, including environment minister Jairam Ramesh are using to push such projects.

That said, we also need to look at the track record of Indian governments in this regard. When it comes to sharing even basic information about the plans of the government in North East India, the Water Resources Ministry refuses to provide basic information to the people of the North East Region. The Ministry refused to provide such information to South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People even under the Right to Information Act. Ultimately SANDRP had to file appeals to the Central Information Commission and the ministry had to provide basic information under the CIC orders. But this and the earlier quoted answer in Parliament from the minister show how callously Indian government deals with these issues. Indian government ensures no proper environment impact assessment, has absolutely no will or capacity to implement environment management plans of the projects and has no law that requires proper participation of affected people in planning and decision making in water resources development or management. India needs to fundamentally change its ways of dealing with the issues related to rivers and dams. Indian government needs to improve its own credibility through more responsive, transparent and environment friendly treatment of rivers and people.

The need of the hour is a comprehensive treaty with China on the river basins that the two countries share. This is also urgently important since the rivers that India shares with China are fed by glaciers, most of which are located inside Tibet. Our knowledge base of these lifelines is very poor and better cooperation is also useful for India in the context of climate change. This has been rightly emphasised by Shri Jairam Ramesh, India’s environment minister. The best way to go forward for India, China, Bangladesh (a downstream country along the Brahmaputra) and even the rest of the world would be to set up a multilateral river basin level mechanism involving not just the governments but the people of three countries to share not just the water of the rivers that India and China share, but also the mountains, the glaciers, the forests, the biodiversity and the associated lives and cultures that also get shared. The Report of the World Commission on Dams provides a very useful starting point for such a mechanism. Interestingly, both Indian and Chinese governments were involved in the work of the WCD so both are familiar with the WCD recommendations.

The Indian and Chinese premiers have an unprecedented historical opportunity to create a river basin management mechanism on these lines for sharing the international rivers. It will not only help the two countries for generations to come, but it has the potential to create a remarkable example for the rest of the world. Such a mechanism can help keep the Brahmaputra basin rivers in the natural state over large parts. Brahmaputra, the fifth largest river in terms of water it carries and second largest in terms of the silt it carries, remains relatively less disturbed among the rivers of the world and provides ideal platform for this. Will the Indian government show the firmness, forthrightness and foresight to propose this to the visiting Chinese Premier?  It can only strengthen Indian government hand in dealing with its bigger neighbour. It will also give huge strength to the fragile bilateral relations that the Chinese ambassador to India referred to on Dec 13, 2010 in Delhi.

Himanshu Thakkar (ht.sandrp@gmail.com)                                                         December 15 2010

South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (www.sandrp.in) 

Environment Ministry needs to take urgent systemic actions

Why the MoEF needs to urgently take up

some systemic tough actions

A completely wrong impression is being created, largely by vested interest lobbies that Union Ministry of Environment & Forests under the leadership of Shri Jairam Ramesh is over reacting in recent months. The situation is exactly the opposite. The Ministry needs to take up some tough systemic actions rather soon if India’s Environment and Forests to have any hope. Fact of the matter is that the Ministry is yet to really start performing the role for which the ministry is created. To illustrate:

• Our rivers continue to remain what the World Bank describes as fetid sewers. The MoEF has the mandate and power to ensure that rivers are not polluted. The Ministry has been empowered with the laws like the Water Pollution Control Act, the Environment Protection Act and so on. It has been provided with huge institutions and sufficient financial resources in terms of thousands of crores, and yet the ministry is yet to achieve a single clean river in the country. Right in the National Capital, the river flowing through it is a gutter as described by many editorials in National papers, but the ministry is unable to take any action to fix that problem.
• The ministry every month continues to give hundreds of clearances under EPA (1986), Environment Impact Notification (2006) and Forest Conservation Act. (1980) accompanied by Forest Rights Act. Each such clearance is accompanied by an Environment Impact Assessment, Environment Management Plan and conditions of clearances. The MoEF has neither the capacity nor the will to ensure compliance with the conditions under which such clearances are given. It does not even know what is going on at project sites. Its field offices do not do any surprise visits to the project sites to ensure if the projects are following the laws of the land. A recent review by the additional Chief Secretary of Himachal Pradesh following a High Court order showed that everyone of the reviewed projects were violating the laws or management plans. But there are practically no consequences for such violations. A recent RTI response from the ministry revealed that over five years after getting environment clearance in Oct 2005, the Polavaram dam in Andhra Pradesh has not submitted a single compliance report when it supposed to submit such reports every six months. No consequenes. Even when the reports submitted to it by the developers (e.g. Karcham Wangtoo hydropower project) or by committees appointed by the ministry (e.g. Sardar Sarovar Project) or by non government organisations (e.g. Tehri Dam and Rampur Hydropower project) show violations, there are still no consequences. And if the ministry does not know what is going on, what action can it take?
• It is an open secret that the EIAs submitted to the ministry are routinely plagiarised,  are cut and paste, and dishonest, seriously compromised jobs, including for the Jaitpur nuclear power plant most recently cleared. But the MoEF has not taken any measures against any of the EIA consultants for filing fraudulent EIAs, even after media has reported and when these issues have been brought to the notice of the ministry one way or the other.
• The ministry still does not have clearly defined norms that only persons with back ground in environmental issues should be selected for the Environment Appraisal Committees appointed by the ministry for scrutinising the applications for clearances. So we have Rakesh Nath heading the EAC for River Valley projects, without having absolutely any background on environmental issues. He was appointed during Mr Jairam Ramesh’s regime, incidentally.

These just a few BIG systematic issues one can highlight, on which urgent action is required if we are to have any semblance of governance on environmental issues. But there is not even a move in that direction.

There is no doubt that Mr Jairam Ramesh has started taking some steps in right direction in some projects. The developers have become used to have an MoEF that is not doing its job, but working as an agent of environment destruction. In such a situation the developers are suddenly crying that there is over reaction from the ministry. However, if one looks at closely, almost in each of the instances where the ministry has taken action, one can see that the action was long over due and that in many cases the action was taken only after people working on ground have high lighted the problems or cases have been filed  in the courts. This is true in case of Lavasa, Vedanta, Posco, Polavaram dam, Maheshwar hydro projects, Renuka Dam, among others. In fact for each such case, one can show dozens of others where action is over due from the MoEF, but the ministry have not yet taken the required action. There are other instances (e.g. SUVs, western life styles being bad for environment or that the National Action Plan on Climate Change should have been formulated in participation with the people at grass roots) where Mr Jairam Ramesh has made statements, but action is still awaited. Actions that can bring systemic change in environment governance so that non compliance invites consequences is still awaited. The Ministry is clearly under reacting.

Himanshu Thakkar (ht.sandrp@gmail.com)                                                 December 6 2010

South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (www.sandrp.in)

An edited version published at: http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/isenvironment-ministry-over-reacting/417440/

The Revised Cost Clearance for SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT

The Pro dam lobby arm twists Planning Commission to take a U turn

The title sounds too juicy. Is that possible in a democracy? Let us look at the facts.

The Planning Commission of Government of India gave investment clearance to the Sardar Sarovar Project in October 1988 for a cost of Rs 6406 crore at 1986-87 prices. The project is still far from complete. The Project applied for over six fold increase in cost of the project earlier this year. This is a narration of what happened to that application in Planning Commission. 

However, let us see what happened at Central Water Commission/ Union Ministry of Water Resources before that in March 2010. 

Water Resources Ministry and CWC So on 11 March 2010, when the application for revised cost approval came before the 103^rd meeting of the Advisory Committee on Irrigation Flood Control and Multi Purpose projects, the note prepared by the Project Appraisal Organisation of the Central Water Commission claimed the Benefit Cost ratio for India’s most controversial large dam was 1.63 even at the revised cost of Rs 39240.45 crores (2008-09 price level). Acting more like a lobby for big dams, the Central Water Commission did not raise any uncomfortable or critical questions about the claims of the Gujarat Government. At the meeting, in response to some questions by the chairman (who is also secretary, Union Ministry of Water Resources), the project authorities gave some factually wrong information. For example, as per the summary record of discussions (all information in this article is obtained under RTI) of the meeting, the project authorities said that among the reasons for delay was, “Besides, stay order from the Supreme Court in May 1995 till Oct 2000 halted physical progress of works although, dam height of 110 m was already attained by May 1995.” Now it is a matter of fact that the dam reached the level of 110 m only in June 2004 and in May 1995 when the stay was given, this author was in the Supreme Court chamber and the dam height then was 80 m. But for SSP authorities, the CWC and the Union Ministry of Water Resources, Kuch bhi chalata hai (anything goes).

The summary record of the meeting accepts that the Command Area Development plan is yet to be approved. Incidentally, that plan was supposed to be completed by 1989. The summary record also notes the claim of the project authority that the project will be completed by March 2014, even though the attached data sheet mentioned the schedule stretching to 2016-17. About Benefit cost ratio calculations, there were many issues. The manipulations done by the project authorities were apparent.

For example, the document was completely silent on the issue of cost of debt the project authority has incurred and will have to incur, it was also completely silent about the CAG reports that showed that the project had diverted, mis-managed the funds and there were also big issues about corruption and poor quality of the work done so far. The project authorities also did not find it fit to explain as to why the canal network was delayed so much, when neither the court stay order nor the agitation against the project stopped them from building the canal network. But such small issues won’t deter the big people from going ahead with big decisions. So the advisory committee “accepted the proposal.” It is clear from the available records that there was little application of mind on the part of either the Central Water Commission or the Union Ministry of Water Resources or any members of the advisory committee before approving a 500% increase in project cost.

The ball then went to the court of Planning Commission through a letter from the Ministry of Water Resources on March 19, 2010. The brief chronology of events in the Planning Commission in this regard is as follows:

·   March 22 2010 PC asks about status of compliance of earlier PC clearance and about R&R.

·   March 24 2010 GOG replies, which is found unsatisfactory by PC.

·   April 7, 2010 A letter goes from PC to Gujarat government raising a series of 19 questions.

·   April 27 2010 The note in the Planning Commission file shows that the answers of GOG are not satisfactory.

·   May 10, 2010 Member (Water Resources), Planning Commission writes following note in the file:

“There are three issues with the SSP:

1.       Environment Compliance

2.       R&R Compliance

3.       Command Area Development

On the first, the MoEF has set up a High Level Advisory Committee on 28^th April 2010 for ascertaining pari passu compliance.

On the second, the Union Minister of State for Water Resources stated in the written reply in the Rajya Sabha on 6^th My that approval from the R&R sub group of the NCA is yet to be obtained.

On the third issue which is of primary concern to the Planning Commission, while providing investment clearance, it has to be emphasised that by all accounts the progress has not been satisfactory and business as usual will not work. A major change is required. I would suggest the GOG set up an Expert Group for advice on how best a PIM approach could be adopted in the SSP Command to improve farmers’ access to water and water use efficiency.”

“In view of the recent damaging observations of the CAG in its report tabled in the Gujarat assembly on 30^th March 2010 (which suggests that only 18.64% of CCA has been developed and that utilised CCA is only 6.56% of envisaged CCA, it is imperative that a considered view be taken on the way forward and a wide range of experts be consulted on how performance can be radically improved.

The GOG should submit the report of the expert group to the Planning Commission By then the first interim report of the YK Alagh Committee on environment compliance set up by the MoEF should also become available and the clearance by the R&R subgroup of NCA obtained.”

·   May 13, 2010 A letter is drafted for GOG following the above note.

·   May 17, 2010 Member (WR) suggests changes in the draft mentioned above and puts a note on the file:” Please note changes I have made in the draft. I just saw CM’s letter to DCH. He may be apprised of our view.”

Thus a draft of the letter from Planning Commission to GoG was prepared stating that the Planning Commission will be guided by the report of the High Level Advisory Committee, the report of the NCA R&R sub-group and the report of the expert committee as suggested above, before according investment clearance for SSP’s revised cost. This did not seem to address all the outstanding issues on SSP, nor was it particularly radical, but it was at least attempting to find a middle ground as a way forward.

But this was clearly unacceptable to the pro dam lobby.

The events moved fast between May 17 and May 20, 2010 and on May 20, the Planning Commission issued the investment clearance without following the steps suggested by the Member (WR) as noted above. The recommendations of the Member (WR) were clearly brushed aside to push ahead with the project. Mr Avinash Mishra, Deputy Advisor (WR) in the Planning Commission, who signed the May 20 clearance letter joked how they took a U turn.

So what happened between May 17 and May 20, 2010? Superficially, a letter from Gujarat Chief Minister to the Prime Minister dated May 1, 2010, urging the PM to expedite the Planning Commission investment clearance for SSP was forwarded to the PC on May 12, 2010. That letter gets mentioned in the May 17, 2010 noting by Member (WR). Very interestingly, the next noting on the file is from MS Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission dated May 20, 2010, which reads: “Discussed the issue with Member (WR) and Member Secretary today. Draft Investment Clearance is put up for approval.” The same day, the investment clearance for over six fold higher cost of SSP was issued by the Planning Commission, brushing aside the more reasonable approach suggested by Member (Water Resources) Shri Mihir Shah. 

But the file notings give only ostensible picture. It is clear that the lobby in favour of the project was working behind the scenes to scuttle the moves that Member (WR), Planning Commission was suggesting. What, how, who and when of these events are unknowns and only one of the players involved in these events can unearth further truth. The only other possibility is that the Prime Minister and the deputy chairman of Planning Commission took the decision to bypass the recommendation of more reasonable, though not the most radical appropriate option available in the situation, suggested by Member (WR). That however, raises even more disturbing questions. Are the Prime Minister and the Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission part of the big dam lobby?

The sad reality is that such lobby is so easily able to brush aside suggestion for slightly objective consideration even for a Rs 40 000 crore decision.

When we released this note, Medha Patkar of Narmada Bachao Andolan sent a prompt response, which also said:

Your Note may also include the fact that while the clearance to the SSP was only for Rs. 6406 crores (until 2010), GoG had spent upto Rs. 30,000 crores (illegally), without any approval of the revised costs.

The cost of the dam as on 2007, as estimated by the Working Group on Water Resources of the XI Plan of Planning Commission is Rs. 45,000 crores, while the same may shoot upto 70,000 crores by 2010.

It is more than obvious that even the Ministry of Water Resources did not, but should have included the agenda to review the Benefit-Cost ration. Pointing out such large scale unaccountability on the usage of public funds and multiplication of costs, such a need for review was also indicated by the Comptroller and Auditor General (In 2004).

The issue is not just about ruling out Mihir Shah’s suggestion, but the Planning Commission making such a shocking U-Turn neither to review the SSP from the angle of economic viability nor even take any action against such 6-time increased in spending without approval.

More questions, but where are the answers?

Himanshu Thakkar